In the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri
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In re the matter of: Bruce Woodruff Kurt |
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Case No. 21C96-25033 . |
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Plaintiff/Petitioner, | ||
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vs. | ||
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Denny's Towing; the City of Kirkwood's municipal patrolman Guyer #223; the City Kirkwood's Chief of Police, Mr. Linza; and the private municipal corporation known as the City of Kirkwood, Missouri, Defendants/Respondents. |
PETITION CONTESTING THE PROPRIETY AND LEGALITY
OF THE TOWING AND IMPOUNDING OF A PICK-UP TRUCK
COMES NOW Plaintiff/Petitioner, Bruce Woodruff Kurt, appearing inops consilii (destitute of counsel), in exercise of his vested right to regulate the internal government and police of this state [cf., Mo. Cons., Art I, §3], and his vested right to petition for the redress of grievances [cf., US Constitution, First Amendment] and calls to contest the propriety and legality of the seizure of his pick-up truck; and in support of said contest, Plaintiff/Petitioner submits the following facts, to wit:
FACTS OF THE CASE
1) This Petition is timely, as it is filed within
the "ten days of receipt" stipulated upon FORM 4577 (see: attachment)
which Petitioner received on November 7th, 1996.
2) All the
Defendants/Respondents listed, are validly listed for these reasons; to wit:
b) Kirkwood municipal patrolman Guyer #223 is a valid defendant/respondent because it was upon his very naked color of authority that Denny's Towing relied to "justify" the tow; and,
c) Chief of Police, Mr. Linza, is a valid defendant/respondent because, as will be shown in greater detail below, it was his illicit policy upon which patrolman Guyer relied for "justification"; and,
d) The private municipal corporation known as the City of Kirkwood, Missouri, is a valid defendant/respondent, as respondeat superior, because said municipal officers (ib.) manifestly(1) claim license, i.e., the authority for their actions, from the offices they hold, and it is the responsibility of said municipal corporation, as both employer and empowerer, to direct the activities of its employees to within constitutional and statutory limitations. {NOTE: The distinction between "officers" and "offices."]
3) As JUVENAL (Decumus Iunius Juvenalis, c. 60-140
A.D., Roman rhetorician, satirical poet) said: "Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?"
Who will guard the guards themselves?
4) The
executively legislated police policy under which the
Plaintiff/Petitioner's pick-up truck was seized is a manifest execution
of punishment for an alleged offense yet to be litigated.
5)
Police officers, being executive officers, are expressly forbidden from
exercising any power of legislation by the "separation of powers",
Missouri Constitution, Article II, Section 1.
6) The
legislation of any Bill of Attainder(2) is prohibited, both to the US Congress
and to the states, by the US Constitution, Article I, Sections 9 and 10. Can
the police legislate one, and thereby accomplish
indirectly that which is expressly prohibited directly? {The
question is rhetorical.}
7) Upon its face FORM 4577 (attached)
speaks of the Petitioner's pick-up truck as having been "abandoned" in
ERROR. {See: below.}
8) Plaintiff/Petitioner did NOT
"abandon" his pick-up truck; on the contrary, plenary possession of
said pick-up was seized pursuant Kirkwood police policy of towing and
impounding vehicles when an arrest is made. [The issue of whether the arrest
was lawfully or legally executed is now before the municipal courts of this
Judicial Circuit and not properly within the subject matter of the instant Case;
however, it is important to bear in mind here that the property seizure,
for all intents and purposes, was effected at gun point. Petitioner risked
being shot if he had resisted the arrest and seizure.]
9) The
property in question was seized without "notice and opportunity to defend";
hence, in traversal of "due process of law," which is Petitioner's
vested right pursuant Mo. Cons., Art. I. §10
10)
The claimed authority for the seizure and tow cannot be any valid Kirkwood City
Ordinance, as such traverses due process, the constitutional
proscription barring bills of attainder, and the statutory limits of the
City's authority as regards the towing of vehicles, viz., RSMo. §71.010.
11)
FORM 4577 (attached) purports upon its face to levy "towing costs" and
"storage costs" upon Plaintiff/Petitioner as "owner", even
though it was not he who contracted for the same. This assessment is
founded and based upon the erroneous presumption that the vehicle was "abandoned."
The fact is that the vehicle was not abandoned, deserted, forsaken, or cast
aside; but was instead taken from Plaintiff/Petitioner by force of arms!
Under the law of contracts, the onus to supply remuneration for services lies
against those who request (contract for) them; in the instant, this is
NOT the Plaintiff/Petitioner.
12) It seems obvious to
Plaintiff/Petitioner that Denny's Towing is operating under the misapprehension
that it has some legal claim to plenary possession of the truck, and that
Plaintiff/Petitioner owes remuneration for the tow and storage of the same;
either that, or it is manifest that Denny's Towing openly and knowingly
has entered into a conspiracy in collusion with the other
Respondents. At present, Plaintiff/Petitioner, being wont to giving the benefit
of any doubt, prefers to believe the former.
SUGGESTED REMEDIES:
1) Because Denny's Towing has no lawful or legal
right or Title to the pick-up truck in question, said Towing Company must
relinquish plenary possession to its rightful owner.
2) Because
the once valid "temporary moving tag" which was current and properly
displayed in the rear window of said pick-up is now expired, and because Denny's
Towing never had any lawful or legal authorization to effect the tow in the
first instance; it is only fair and just that this Court order Denny's Towing to
tow Plaintiff/Petitioner's pick-up truck to a location within the St. Louis area
without charge.
3) A permanent injunction should issue from
this Court against the Defendants/Respondents, barring further transgressions
against people's property rights, with pains and penalties attached thereto in
the case of transgression; as the Constitutions and Statutes have proven
impotent to vouchsafe.
4) The unhappy circumstance of this Case
has shaken the Plaintiff/Petitioner's ability to trust in government to its
roots. Plaintiff/Petitioner has suffered the illicit seizure of his
property, delay in his ability to work on it, and now that the weather has
turned foul, restoration of his antique and classic vehicle to
pristine condition has to be conducted indoors at greater expense. Therefore:
the Plaintiff/Petitioner seeks damages from Defendants/Respondents in an amount
commiserative to the distress he endures, estimated at $75,000.
| Respectfully submitted, | |
| Dated this 12th day of November, 1996. | _________________________________ |
| Bruce Woodruff Kurt, Plaintiff/Petitioner, | |
| Pro Per, Inops Consilii. | |
| 1809 W. Woodbine Ave. | |
| Kirkwood, MO 63122 |
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
Petitioner certifies that a true and valid complete
copy of this Petition will be served upon the Respondents: DENNY'S TOWING, 941
S. KIRKWOOD RD., KIRKWOOD, MO 63122; and, patrolman Guyer, Chief of Police
Linza, and the City of Kirkwood Missouri, at the Kirkwood City Hall, 139 S.
Kirkwood Rd., Kirkwood, Mo. 63122; by the Sheriff of St. Louis County. Further:
Pursuant the instruction on FORM 4577, a copy of this Petition is being served
upon the Missouri Director of Revenue, who is not among Defendants/Respondents,
by certified US Mail.
___________________
Bruce W. Kurt
(1)
MANIFESTA PROBATIONE NON INDIGENT. [Things manifest require no proof.]
(2)
Bills of Attainder allow the seizure of property without a court appearance.